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Conditionals and Unconditionals: 
Cross-linguistic and Logical Aspects 
Dietmar Zaefferer 
Institut für Deutsche Philologie 
Universität München 
Schellingstr. 3 
D-8000 München 40 
Although conditional sentences are important in 
all languages, and although their 'logic' has been 
thoroughly, if inconclusively, investigated by 
philosophers, our knowledge and understanding of 
them in the languages of the world is very poor. 
(Palmer 1986: 188) 
0. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to argue against the sceptic tenor of its anti-motto, the 
quotation of Palmer's, and for the continuation of a love story called 'typology meets 
formal semantics' that has started its delicate course some time ago at the 1983 Stanford 
symposium on conditionals, and that still needs a lot of encouragement in order to 
blossom. I think that it deserves this encouragement because it promises substantial 
progress both for the research in typology and linguistic universals and for formal 
semantics and language-oriented logics. I will try to argue for this using the example of 
conditional forms and functions and their relatives on the one hand, and a theory of 
conditionals inspired by ideas of Barwise, Gärdenfors, Heim, Kratzer, Lewis and Rott 1 
on the other. Whereas this paper emphasizes the typological data and presents the theory 
only in rough outline, a (partially overlapping) companion paper to the present one 
(Zaefferer 1990) spells out the theory in more detail after only a short summary of the 
typological findings. To get started, some terminological clarifications will be proposed 
and some methodological principles will be stated. 
0.1. Terminological clarifications 
First: What do I understand by a conditional? A conditional or more explicitly a 
conditional form is a grammatical structure or construction that encodes a conditional 
function as its primary purpose. And what is a conditional function? A conditional 
function is something that conditionalizes any proposition q, i.e., that converts q into the 
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proposition that something, normally the holding of some given proposition p, is (in a 
way) sufficient for the holding of q. 
I will call the proposition that is to be conditionalized the consequent, the conditionali-
zing proposition the antecedent, and the result of the conditionalizaüon the c-proposition, 
reserving these Latin terms for the semantic level. On the syntactic level, I wil l use the 
Greek terms apodosis and protasis: 'apodosis' for the unmodified (but sometimes 
marked) superordinate linguistic form, 'protasis' for the modifying subordinate form, 
and c-construction for the combination of the two. Please note that, taken this way, most 
of the time, the apodosis encodes just the consequent, but the protasis does not only 
encode the antecedent, but also the conditional relation it stands in with respect to the 
consequent, in other words it normally encodes the whole conditional function. The 
division of labor among the three linguistic forms varies however from language to 
language and from construction to construction. Note further that in addition both 
protasis and apodosis can encode quantification over various consequents with respect to 
various antecedents. 
Second: What is an unconditional? A n unconditional or more explicitly an 
unconditional form is a grammatical structure or construction that encodes an 
unconditional function as its primary purpose. And what is an unconditional function? A n 
unconditional function is something that deconditionalizes any proposition qy i.e., that 
converts q into the proposition that the holding of any one of a given set of propositions 
P is (in a way) sufficient for the holding of q, where P exhausts the set of options that are 
taken into consideration at the present state of the discourse, in other words the 
proposition that the holding of q is unconditional on the question which one of the 
members of P happens to be true, where it is implicated, i f not tautological, that at least 
one of them in fact is true. 
Sentences (1) and (2) are examples of an English conditional and unconditional form, 
respectively. 
(1) If a cangaroo loses its tail, it topples over. 
(2) Whether you like it or not, I won't permit smoking here. 
After these terminological remarks, I would like to give a cross-linguistc overview both 
of the domain of conditional forms and their relatives and of the conceptual field of the 
conditional functions and related concepts. 
Why? Because it is a well-known universal tendency that polysemy is more wide-
spread than homonymy, i.e., identical forms tend to encode related concepts. And this 
rule can be generalized: 
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(PI ) Identical or related forms tend to encode related concepts, 
where relatedness of form is defined as phonological and structural similarity, and this in 
turn as number of common features, and where relatedness of concepts is defined as 
either as similarity again (cf. metaphors) or as contiguity, especially in the subconcept-
superconcept hierarchy (cf. metonymy). 
Conceptual relatedness need not be universal, but there must be a core domain of 
universally related concepts in the conceptual fields of all linguistic communities. Which 
conceptual fields are in this universal domain, and what is their universal structure? If our 
principle (PI) is correct, then cross-linguistically recurring patterns of relatedness of 
forms indicate relatedness of the encoded concepts and make the latter good candidates 
for universally related concepts. Let me state this as principle (P2): 
(P2) Cross-linguistically recurring patterns of formal and conceptual 
relatedness indicate universality of the conceptual relations. 
Concepts like the ones encoded by logical constants, and the relations among them are of 
course top candidates for universal conceptual structures,2 but it is also important to see 
how logical concepts link up with non-logical ones, and here recurring relatedness 
patterns in both form and function offer an important window on the common 
denominator of human conceptual systems. 
Therefore in order to understand fully what conditionalization is, it is helpful, I 
submit, to look at it in the context of universally related concepts. So the working 
hypothesis for the following overview is a specialization of principle (PI): 
(Pic) Relatives of conditional forms tend to encode concepts that are relatives of 
conditional functions. 
1. Condit ional forms and their relatives across languages 
1.1. Condi t ional forms in English 
Conditional functions are proposition modifiers, consequently, conditional forms are 
sentence adverbials.3 Therefore, like other sentence adverbials, they can be of one of the 
following types: 
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(a) Lexical adverbials, i.e., adverbs; 
(b) Phrasal adverbials, i.e., prepositional phrases and other sub-clausal con-
structions; or 
(c) Sentential adverbials, i.e., adverbial clauses. 
A n adverbial clause can itself be complex, especially can it take the form of another 
conditional construction, witness (1): 
(1) If you open the radiator if the engine is hot, you might get burned. 
This shows that conditionalization is not an exceptional root sentence phenomenon, but a 
regular recursive one, like many other grammatical phenomena. 
Lexical conditionals in English are restricted to a few words. Let's examine three ex-
amples: 
(2) Then we are really in trouble. 
(3) Mathematical problems are sometimes very hard to solve. 
(4) Swimming is not always easy. 
To see what makes then, sometimes, and always lexical conditionals, consider the 
following three sentences: 
(5) Under these circumstances we are really in trouble. 
(6) Mathematical problems are in some cases very hard to solve. 
(7) Swimming is not under all conditions easy. 
And i f these examples of phrasal conditionals are not convincing either, consider the 
following clausal ones: 
(8) If all our money is lost we are really in trouble. 
(9) Mathematical problems are very hard to solve when they are posed by a 
malevolent expert. 
(10) Swimming is not easy if you haven't practiced for a long while. 
Now it is easy to see that not only (8) - (10), but also (2) - (7) involve genuine condi-
tionals. First imagine a context like the one created by (11): 
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(11) I'm afraid all our money is lost. 
Clearly, in such a context, (2), (5) and (8) are local paraphrases of each other. Fur-
thermore, putting special contexts aside, it is obvious that (3) and (6) follow from (9), as 
well as (4) and (7) follow from (10), and it is possible to cook up clausal //-paraphrases 
also for examples (3) and (4). 
Now let's have a closer look at the lexical conditionals. A l l of them are structure 
words, i.e., they encode structural, and not lexical meaning. Then is an anaphoric pro-
form that refers to a previously mentioned proposition and puts it into the role of an 
antecedent, i.e., a form that encodes a condition. Its meaning can therefore be analysed 
into two parts: the anaphorical pointer at some given proposition, and the two-place 
conditional function, i.e., the function that takes this proposition and converts it into a 
one-place conditional function. 
Sometimes and always, on the other hand, do not refer at all, they are adverbs of 
quantification that in our examples quantify not over times, but over conditions. 
Therefore their meaning can be analysed as consisting of two different parts, a quantifier 
and a sortal indication of what is quantified over, namely conditional functions ('times' or 
'ways'). 
A l l examples for phrasal conditionals given above were prepositional phrases with the 
same anaphoric and quantificational properties as just discussed in the context of the 
lexical conditionals, except that they are more specific than these since they distinguish 
between cases, conditions, and circumstances. But like the lexical conditionals, they do 
not spell out the conditions they are alluding at, and this does not come as a surprise, 
since conditions are propositions in a special role, and propositions are normally encoded 
by clauses, so the normal, full and independent expression of a condition is a clausal 
conditional. 
Clausal conditionals are exemplified in (8) - (10) above. In (8) the protasis is 'If all 
our money is lost', epressing the conditional function with the antecedent that all our 
money is lost, the apodosis is 'we are really in trouble', expressing the consequent 
proposition that we are really in trouble, (8) itself is the c-construction and the 
c-proposition expressed by it is the proposition that the truth of the antecedent, namely 
that all our money is lost is sufficient for or requires the truth of the consequent, i.e., that 
we are really in trouble, in other words whatever circumstances might make it true that all 
our money is lost also make it true that we are really in trouble. And similarly for (9) and 
(10). 
We haven't looked yet at clausal counterparts for (3) and (4), the quantified examples, 
but they are easy to construct, cf. (12) and (13). 
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(12) Sometimes if you want to take a subway train it is already full. 
(13) If something is very expensive, it is not always also very good. 
The examples show that both quantifying protases and quantifiying apodoses exist. The 
semantic effect is in both cases the same, since what is quantified over are cases of the 
conditional relation, i.e., some sufficiency relation holding between antecedent and 
consequent. Thus the c-proposition expressed by (12) is the proposition that in some 
cases the truth of the antecedent, namely that some person wants to take the subway train 
X, suffices for the truth of the consequent, i.e., that x is already full. And the 
c-proposition expressed by (13) is the proposition that the truth of the antecedent, namely 
that some thing y is very expensive, does not in all cases suffice for the truth of the 
consequent, i.e., that y is very good. 
So we have to distinguish between bare and quantifying c-constructions and ac-
cordingly between bare and quantifying c-propositions. And this distinction is correlated 
with another one which is more familiar in NP-semantics than in clause semantics, the 
distinction of number or more precisely of semantic number, i.e., quantity (cf. G . Link's 
contribution to this volume). 
The distinction comes up if contingent constraints require that there be at most one pair 
of antecedent and consequent, for instance if the death of a person is concerned. Consider 
(14) and (15): 
(14) If Max has died, he has committed suicide. 
(15) If Max has died, he has always committed suicide. 
(15) is not ungrammatical, but it is in conflict with the constraint 'you die only once', 
which shows that quantified c-constructions carry the implicature that there has to be 
more that one case of the antecedent. 
On the other hand there are c-constructions like the German /a//j-construction that 
require the opposite, namely that only one instantiation of the antecedent be considered, 
as can be seen from the following examples: 
(16) Wenn Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert. 
If Steffi wins, IMPERS.PASSIVE celebrate. 
(17) Immer wenn Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert. 
Always if Steffi wins, IMPERS.PASSIVE celebrate. 
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(18) Falls Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert. 
In-case Steffi wins, IMPERS.PASSIVE celebrate. 
(19) *Immer falls Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert. 
Always in-case Steffi wins, IMPERS.PASSIVE celebrate. 
To sum up these findings let us say that explicitly quantified c-constructions are plural 
forms, bare c-constructions with particles like z/are transnumerai forms (unspecified with 
respect to number), and that bare c-constructions with particles like falls are singular 
forms. 
1.2. A universal inventory of conditional markers 
So far we have looked only at markers for protasis clauses that happened to be particles 
or subordinating conjunctions like if, in case, wenn, or falls, but it is well known that 
there are more means for marking clauses as protases, or more generally as c-
constructions, in the languages of the world, 4 and also in English and German. 
They can be arranged in the following four groups: 
(a) Morphological conditional markers 
(a) i . Mood markers 
One can speak of morphological mood markers if there is a special set of inflexional 
forms in the verbal paradigms that encode a conditional mood, i.e., which mark those 
clauses as protases that have this form as their main verb form or forms, alone or together 
with other markers. A well-know example of a language with this kind of marking is 
Turkish. Other examples are West Greenlandic, Aranda (a Pama-Nyungan language), 
Basque and Nkore-Kiga (a Bantu language). The following example is from West 
Greenlandic:5 
(20) pakasa-anna-rukku pissanganar-niru-vuq 
surprise just 2s-3s-COND be-exciting more 3s-INDIC 
'If you just surprise him it will be more exciting' 
(a) i i . Other suffixes 
The Papuan language Hua 6 and Imbabura Quechua7 have other morphological devices 
for conditional marking that are not verbal mood markers but mark a clause as 
subordinate and topical, and thereby as protasis. 
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(b) Lexical conditional markers 
These are the words or lexicalized expressions, mostly particles, that convert a simple 
clause into a protasis clause. Examples were given in section 1.1. Danielsen (1968) 
distinguishes between those lexical conditional markers which combine with negative 
forms and those that don't an instead have special forms for negated protases like Danish 
(hvis ' i f vs. medmindre ' i f not'). Some lexical protasis markers are relative pro-forms, 
the protasis being a free relative clause. A n example are German we>w-clauses, which 
abstract out of the protasis clause the sum of conditions that are sufficient for the truth of 
the antecedent. Plugging them into another clause makes the proposition of the latter 
depend on precisely these conditions. This is exactly parallel to other free relatives, for 
instance local ones, which abstract out of a proposition its location and make it thus 
available as the location for another proposition, cf. (21) and (22): 
(21) Wo man singt, da laß dich ruhig nieder. 
Where one sings, there let yourself quietly down. 
(Locations of singing are locations where you can settle quietly) 
(22) Wenn eine Zahl durch vier teilbar ist, dann ist sie gerade. 
If a number by four divisible is, then is it even. 
(Conditions of being divisable by four for a number are conditions of it 
being even) 
(c) Phrasal conditional markers 
These are mostly modifications of some default complementizer. A good example of a 
language with a host of different constructions of this type is Spanish, where the default 
complementizer is que 'that' and where among others the following phrasal protasis 
markers exist: suponiendo que, 'supposing that', ya sea que, literally 'be it already that', 
siempre que, literally 'always that', con tal que, literally 'with such that'. A n illustration 
is (23): 
(23) Te perdono con tal que vayas. 
To-you forgive-Is with such that go-SUBJUNCTIVE-2s. 
'I forgive you if you go.' 
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(d) Structural conditional markers 
A marked word order can indicate that a given clause functions as a protasis. A good 
example is German, where verb-first clauses are quite commonly used as protases. 
(24) Ist der Ruf erst ruiniert, lebt sich's gänzlich ungeniert. 
Is the reputation but ruined, live-IMPERS entirely free-and-easy. 
'Once the reputation is gone life is entirely free and easy.' 
Note that no ambiguity can arise here as to which clause is the subordinate one and which 
one is the main clause, since German declaratives are verb-second, and therefore the first 
clause cannot be the main clause. 
Summing up this overview of conditional markers it has to be stressed that they are by 
no means mutually exclusive in one construction, and that on the contrary cooccurrence is 
quite frequent, in some cases even obligatory. 
The latter is the case for instance with English so-called counterfactuals, where 
morphosyntactic marking of the verbal mood and tense has to cooccur with either an if-
marking or a verb-first construction of the protasis, compare (25) and (26). 
(25) If I had known, I would not have gone. 
(26) Had I known, I would not have gone. 
1.3. Relatives of the conditional forms across languages 
Next follows an overview of the relatives of the conditional forms, including the same 
forms with different readings, and of their functions. If (Pic) above is correct, this wil l 
amount to giving an overview of those concepts that are tendentially most closely related 
to the conditional function. 
(a) Relatives of the morphological conditional markers 
(a) i . Mood markers 
Not all languages have a conditional verbal mood, but those that have it tend to use it for 
other purposes in addition to the conditional marking. For instance West Greenlandic 
uses its conditional forms also for future marking. So future time reference, or time 
reference in general is one concept encoded by related forms and therefore a good 
candidate for a related notion. 
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Other languages that don't have a conditional mood do have other non-indicative 
moods, and these share with the conditional the property of separating the propositional 
content, Frege's 'Gedanke', from its assertion. Compare the German subjunctive I, that 
functions among others as a quotative evidential and shifts thus the responsability for the 
truth of the proposition in its scope to another person. 
(27) Das Haus sei noch nicht fertig. 
The house be-SUBJ still not ready 
(only in quotative contexts) 
A more common non-indicative mood is the imperative, which, as is well known, can 
also occur in a marked, but cross-linguistically widespread conditional construction, cf. 
(28): 
(28) Pay him well, and he will do anything for you. 
These findings can be summarized as presenting evidence that conditionally seems to be 
treated by natural languages as some kind of modal concept, or at least as a concept that 
belongs to the aspect-tense-mood-cluster.8 
(a) i i . Topic markers 
The protasis-marking suffixes of Hua and Quechua mentioned above serve primarily as 
topic markers, and this is not surprising, since protases tend to be topical all over the 
world. 9 This fact has lead John Haiman to the thesis that 'conditionals are topics', 1 0 and 
he means this not just as subsumption, but as identity,1 1 but most linguists wil l consider 
this untenable and exaggerated. Ferguson et al. for instance write: "It is clear that not all 
topics are conditional clauses, and not all conditional clauses (at least in the sense of 
clauses with ' if) are topics." 1 2 Nevertheless, there is something to be accounted for. 
(b) Relatives of the lexical conditional markers: 
(b) i . Interrogative subordinators: 
The relation between protasis markers and interrogative subordinators is especially nice to 
see in English, where //serves both functions, and the difference between the (argument) 
interrogative and the (non-argument) conditional can sometimes be only recognized from 
the intonation or punctuation: 
(29) I will ask Max if he prefers that. 
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(30) I wil l ask Max, if he prefers that. 
In (29) ' i f introduces an interrogative clause and could be replaced by 'whether1, in (30) 
it marks a conditional clause and could be replaced by 'in case'. 
(b) i i . Temporal subordinators 
The relation between protasis markers and temporal subordinators is especially nice to see 
in German, where wenn serves both functions, and the difference between the two is 
often hard to tell: 
(31) Wenn du nach München kommst, ruf mich bitte gleich an. 
If/When you to Munich come, call me please immediately Particle 
Here, with the temporal reading, the gleich 'immediately' can only be interpreted as 
referring to your time of arrival, whereas the conditional reading allows (and even 
prefers) an interpretation of gleich as referring to the moment of uptake or the moment 
when the issue coded in the antecedent is decided. 
(b) i i i . Local subordinators 
Local subordinators are sometimes used in a metaphorical sense, localizing the main 
clause proposition not in the same real space as the subordinate clause proposition, but in 
the same abstract space of possibilities: 
(32) Ihm geht es gut, wo nicht exzellent. 
3p .DAT goes it well, where not excellent. 
'He is doing well, i f not excellent.' 
This fits well together with the etymological information that Romance si comes from a 
second person deictic plus locative. 1 3 Conditional use of where can also be observed in 
English: 
(33) Where a man has two women, there will be trouble sooner or later. 
(34) The value of / f o r A is Ax, where Ax is that subset of A, that... 
Here again the w/zere-clause does not specify the spacio-temporal location of the main-
clause proposition, but the condition for its validity. 
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(b) iv. Causal subordinators 
In view of what is often claimed about the roots of conditionalization in causality, one 
would expect to have direct relations between causal and conditional subordinators. But 
they are not easy to find, by contrast with the indirect connection via the topic markers 
and temporal subordinators. The latter can be seen in a comparison of two parallel 
sentences of German and English, (35) and (36). English while and German weil are 
historically the same word, but whereas the English form has retained its temporal 
meaning, the German form has developed into a causal subordinator: 
(35) Weil er warten muß, liest er ein Buch. 
Because he wait must, reads he a book. 
(36) While he has to wait, he is reading a book. 
(b) v. Concessive subordinators 
If one considers with König (this volume) concessive subordination the dual counterpart 
of causal subordination (and I think one should), it should not come as a surprise that 
here again the links with conditional marking are obvious. German w^nn-clauses are 
prototypical conditionals, but the modal particle auch can modify them in two ways: If 
wenn comes first, the result is a concessive, if auch comes first, the result is an even if-
conditional. 
(37) Wenn er auch warten muß, er bleibt gutgelaunt. 
If he as-well wait must, he remains in-good-spirits. 
'Although he has to wait, he remains in good spirits.' 
(38) Auch wenn er warten muß, bleibt er gutgelaunt. 
As-well if he wait must, remains he in-good-spirits. 
'Even i f he has to wait, he remains in good spirits.' 
(c) Formal relatives of the phrasal conditional markers 
A l l our examples of phrasal conditional markers had the form of prepositional phrases. 
Prepositional phrases can also be used for spatial, temporal, causal and concessive 
specification, which already have been shown to be related concepts. In addition there are 
phrases like the one in (39) that have the function of relativizing the validity of a claim by 
restricting it to some aspects of its subject. 
(39) In certain respects, this has been an extraordinary meeting. 
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Here a modal dement can be observed, although it is not one of the standard modals. 
These can be shown to be closely related by comparing under any circumstances with 
necessarily/obligatorily, under no circumstances with impossibly, and under certain 
circumstances with possibly. 
(d) Formal relatives of the structural conditional markers 
We have observed above that marked word order can serve as a structural conditional 
marker, e.g. verb-first in German or auxiliary-first in English. A s is well known, the 
same formal means may serve additional purposes which are again modal in nature, 
namely the marking of sentence mood, especially the imperative and the interrogative 
one. (41) gives an example of the latter, (40) is the corresponding c-construction: 
(40) Hast du was, dann bist du was. 
Have you something, then are you something. 
(41) Hast du was? Dann bist du was. 
Have you something? Then are you something. 
Interrogatives share with conditionals the property of not claiming their prepositional 
content. No wonder that the German construction exemplified in (40) developed out of 
the construction exemplified in (41). 
1.3. Summary of section 1 
Summing up the results of our attempt to place conditionals into the context of their 
conceptual relatives across languages, we can say that we have found good evidence for 
the following assumptions: 
(a) Conditionalization is a modal concept, i.e., a conditionalized proposition is a 
modalized proposition. Hence conditionals are modal operators. Just as you can say 
'possibly' and necessarily', you can say in a way 'conditionally', 'unconditionally', 
and '^-conditionally.' 
(b) To conditionalize a proposition is to localize it (in a metaphorical sense) in a 
hypothetical domain and thereby to relativize the validity of the consequent. 
(c) The kind of modality expressed is according to the quantifier in the explicitly 
quantifying conditionals (just as with their local and temporal relatives), and it is some 
kind of accompaniment with bare conditionals, whose precise nature cannot be 
determined from the data and remains to be specified. 
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Now it is interesting to note that the research on conditionals in logically oriented formal 
semantics in the last twenty years came up with several accounts that can be interpreted as 
different attempts at spelling out one or the other specification of exactly this idea, 
although most of their authors did their in-depth-analyses without looking at languages 
other than their own. 
2. A cross-linguistically backed account of conditionals and uncon-
dit ional 
The affinity between the conceptual picture that emerges from cross-linguistic comparison 
and more recent formal semantics for conditionals can be seen most easily in those 
approaches that are cast in the possible worlds framework, because here the modal 
element is most conspicuous, but I hope to be able to show that it carries over to situation 
semantics, and I would venture the prediction that in the long run it wi l l find its most 
convincing expression in this framework.1 4 
2.1. The inadequacy of material implication and some proposals of how to 
overcome it 
Several years ago, Angelika Kratzer told at the Chicago CLS-meeting the sad story of the 
decline of the Gricean account in the analysis of natural language conditionals (Kratzer 
1986). The Gricean account tries to stick to material implication by explaining away its 
well-known problems with Grices well-known implicatures, and Kratzer argues that this 
does not work. A l l her arguments have to do with quantification and modality and are 
therefore in line with our cross-linguistic evidence that conditionalization is a modal 
concept. It is interesting to note in passing that she does not mention a very simple way to 
show that modality is involved, that can be found among others in Link 1979. It goes as 
follows. From the assumption that the natural conditional is the material implication, it 
follows that (1) and (2) are paraphrases of each other (the corresponding formulae are 
logically equivalent). But they are not paraphrases. (1) follows from (2), but not vice 
versa. 
(1) It is not the case that Mary gets sad if it rains. 
(2) It rains and Mary doesn't get sad. 
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What does follow from (1), and indeed seems a good paraphrase of it, is (3), and this 
shows that (1) contains a hidden generalizing modal element under the negation operator. 
(3) It's possible that both it rains and Mary doesn't get sad. 
Therefore what at first glance looks like a good paraphrase for the conditional in (1), 
namely (4), turns out to be a sloppy way of saying what is more explicitly said by (5): 
(4) Rain doesn't occur without Mary getting sad. 
(5) Rain doesn't possibly occur without Mary getting sad. 
(5) in turn invites paraphrases like (6) or (7), and there we are right at the heart of a 
modern formal account of conditionals. 
(6) Any rain situation comes with a situation where Mary gets sad. 
(7) Any case of raining is accompanied by a case of Mary getting sad. 
One important step in the right direction was Lewis's treatment of adverbs of 
quantification as quantifiers over cases (Lewis 1975). Then Angelika Kratzer, drawing 
on Lewis' and other work, developed a unified theory of modality, that included not only 
a treatment of deontic and doxastic modal verbs, but also indicative and subjunctive 
conditionals (Kratzer 1978, 1981). Lewis had treated the latter in a very similar fashion, 
introducing the notion of a variably strict conditional (Lewis 1973). Irene Heim, working 
in parallel with Hans Kamp, embedded the conditionals into an incremental semantics 
(Heim 1982), and Jon Barwise rethought the old story in terms of strong intensionality, 
i.e., without possible worlds, but like Kratzer with the important notion of background 
as a relativization device (Barwise 1986). 
Backgrounds can of course be compared with epistemic states, which are at the core 
of conditional logics like Gärdenfors's, but at least two important differences have to be 
born in mind: First, epistemic states are mostly modeled by sets of sentences, not by 
propositions or situation types, 1 5 and second, as Barwise has pointed out, the speaker 
might not know what the relevant background conditions are. However, if one rethinks 
belief change as incremental (or better step-by-step) specification of the described 
situation, theories of epistemic dynamics can be brought to bear in the development of 
situation semantics, and that is exactly what I am going to propose. 
Gärdenfors's logic for conditionals is based on the Ramsey test, which says that a c-
construction is element of a given epistemic state K just in case its apodosis is element of 
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the epistemic state that is the result of revising K to contain the protasis. This is what the 
following formula says. 
(R) A > B € K iff B e K A 
Recently, Gärdenfors has come to doubt the role of the Ramsey test as a basic ingredient 
of conditionals, because in non-trivial cases it contradicts some monotonicity assump-
tions, 1 6 but Hans Rott has argued that monotonicity is questionable anyway and that the 
incompatibilty results should therefore not be turned against the Ramsey test 1 7 Since the 
Ramsey test-based conditional relation holds between any two sentences A and B that are 
already in K , which doesn't seem to be desirable, Rott proposes to replace it by a relation 
that is based on what he calls the strong Ramsey test. It requires not only the presence of 
B in the A-revision of K , but also its absence in the non-A-revision of K . This is 
formally expressed in (SR): 
(SR) A » B G K iff B e K A & B e K ~ A 
The strong Ramsey test shows clearly the modal or dispositional character of 
conditionals, for it relates 'if A , then B' with two mutually exclusive alternative revisions 
of K . 
I think that the intention behind the strengthening of the Ramsey test is correct, but 
that it results in an overkill. Remember that according to the original Ramsey test both 'if 
A then B' and ' i f B then A ' are in K , once both 'A ' and 'B ' are in K . That certainly does 
not seem to be intuitively warranted. But now with the strong Ramsey test we exclude the 
possiblity that both ' i f A then B' and 'if not-A then B' are in K , which doesn't seem to be 
intuitively adequate either. 
So it looks like we may be better off if we give up epistemic state revisions altogether 
in favor of something else, which could be called situation specification updates. Here is 
an outline of how this can be conceived. 
2.2. Sketch of a strongly intensional update semantics 
The picture of a typologically backed account of conditionals and related constructions 
that I am going to outline here in a framwork that I will call update semantics18 integrates 
features from all the approaches mentioned in the last section. Its main innovation is a 
distinction between that characterization of the described situation which is actually 
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accepted, and those characterizations of the same situation which are only taken into 
consideration. This differentiation seems to be needed if one wants to be able to account 
for both the similarities and the differences between conditionals and their relatives, 
especially unconditional, but its introduction has been motivated in the first place by the 
desire to account for non-declarative sentences. Interrogatives for instance in their normal 
use don't contribute to the accepted description of the intended topic situation, but only to 
the stack of descriptions that are considered. 
The semantics is called update semantics because progress in discourse is conceived 
of as constant updating at both the discourse level, i.e., the discourse situation, and the 
discourse content level, i.e., the described situation. Every update takes place with 
respect to a background that is divided into four parts by the two oppositions 
factual/virtual and discourse/content. 
The factual discourse background contains (at least) the situations that are made real 
by the preceding discourse, the virtual discourse background contains the discourse 
options that are open to the participants. E.g., i f Max utters to M i a first "It's getting 
dark." and then "What time is it?", then normally that creates first a factual discourse 
background containing a situation of the type Max asserting towards Mia that it is getting 
dark and a virtual discourse background containing for Mia among others the option of 
commenting on that, and then a factual discourse background containing in addition a 
situation of the type Max asking Mia for the time and a virtual discourse background 
containing for Mia among others the option of answering the question and the option of 
rejecting it. 
Now before I go on to say something about the factual and the virtual content 
background, I have to answer three questions: 
(a) What corresponds to a belief revision in update semantics? 
(b) How does this notion of background relate to Barwise's notion of 
background? 
(c) How do the answers to these two questions relate to the Austinian 
conception of a proposition? 
The answer to the first question and to part of the last one is this: A proposition p is 
always about a situation Sp, let me call it the intended topic situation of p or simply the 
domain of p, and it says of this sp that it is of a type tp, let me call it the characterizing 
situation type of p or simply the type of p. Now the update semantical counterpart of a 
belief change in epistemic dynamics is in the simplest case an additional characterization 
of the same intended topic situation (expansion). So the Austinian notion of a proposition 
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is dynamicized into an Austinian picture of changing discourse content. Once the end of a 
discourse stretch is reached, this is of course indistinguishable from the old picture. But 
the dynamic picture helps also to state identity criteria for discourses: The end of a 
(stretch of) discourse is reached once the intended topic situation is changed. E.g., Max's 
two utterances cited above belong to the same stretch of discourse since they are about the 
same intended topic situation, namely the factual discourse situation. A n utterance of "Joe 
is probably still asleep" would change the topic situation, i f it is known to both Max and 
Mia that Joe lives in Hawaii. 
How does this picture go together with Barwise's notion of a background? A 
discourse cannot start off from zero, i.e., without any characterization of what the 
intended topic situation is and what it looks like, but from some mostly quite general 
initial characteristics, which come from the pre-discourse situation and which I would 
like to call the initialization of a discourse content. So the content of a discourse at any of 
its states is the result of a sequence of updates of its initialization. Barwise's examples are 
compatible with the view that what he has in mind when he speaks of backgrounds for 
conditionals is exactly what I call the initialization of a discourse content. One of his main 
points, that backgrounds need not be (fully) known to discourse participants, can be 
argued analogously with respect to content initializations. 
If this is correct, then my notion of a factual content background differs from 
Barwise's insofar as it does not only refer to the initialization of a discourse content, but 
also to its state at the moment when a new discourse contribution is made, and the two 
coincide only in the case of the very first contribution to a discourse. But maybe I am 
missing here what Barwise had in mind and the two notions coincide entirely. 
The default initialization of a standard discourse (as opposed to its content) could be 
spelled out as 'Normal circumstances obtain'. This excludes spatial separation of the 
discourse participants as well as emergency situations etc. Cooperative discourse 
participants are obliged to update this initialization explicitly if it is not obvious that it is 
wrong. 
Having said this I can say what the factual content background is. It is the Austinian 
proposition characterizing the intended topic situation as being of that type that is the 
result of changing the discourse initialization by the preceding discourse contributions 
and that is accepted as factual by the discourse participants. By contrast, the virtual 
content background is a set of options, of ways the intended topic situation could be and 
that are thematized. Each one of these options characterizes the intended topic situation by 
a different type and the set exhausts the ways the topic situation could be that are taken 
into consideration at the present state of the discourse. So formally the content 
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background could be modeled as the set of Austinian propositions that is its virtual part 
together with one distinguished element, that is its factual part. 
In fact, every assertive discourse contribution updates first the virtual content 
background and only if it is accepted is it copied to the factual content background. If it is 
rejected or retracted, it stays in the virtual part of the background. 
In the above example, Max's first discourse contribution has added to both the virtual 
and then, because Mia didn't object, to the factual content background (i.e., all of its 
elements) a characterization by the type 'it is getting late'. His second discourse 
contribution has not changed the factual content background, but has multiplied the 
elements of the virtual content background by enhancing their description by the 
parametric type 'it is x o'clock'. So assuming that Max opened the discourse with his 
first utterance and that the initialization states among others that the utterance time is either 
5 or 6 o'clock, the discourse state after the two contributions wil l have a factual content 
background with the topic situation characterized by the initialization and the type 'it is 
getting late', and the virtual content background will have two members, one where the 
topic situation is characterized by the initialization, the type 'it is getting late', and the type 
'it is 5 o'clock', and one where the topic situation is characterized by the initialization, the 
type 'it is getting late', and the type 'it is 6 o'clock'. 
Both the factual and the virtual content background can be modeled by Austinian 
propositions with a parameter for the intended topic situation. A discourse wil l then be 
called true just in case the result of anchoring this parameter to the intended topic situation 
and of anchoring all parameters in the factual content background type is a true 
proposition. The propositions in the virtual content background will be called issues, a 
term I borrow from John Perry, and therefore issues are what is mostly called the 
propositional content of an utterance. If the utterance is assertive, then the issue is 
intended to be included in the factual content background, else it is going to be integrated 
into the virtual content background, as e.g. with interrogative, imperative or optative 
utterances. How is this difference modeled in update semantics? The difference is that an 
assertive discourse contribution, if it is accepted, has the effect that both the factual and 
copies of all members of the virtual content background are updated to include the type of 
the new proposition into the restriction, but with a nonassertive discourse contribution 
only the members of the virtual background are updated in such a way. 
Here, the differences among the major types of interrogatives come to bear: A polarity 
interrogative induces a simple update of a copy of each element of the virtual background, 
an rt-membered alternative interrogative induces for each element of the virtual 
background n updated versions, and an n-place constituent interrogative induces for each 
element of the virtual background an n-times parametric updated version. 
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Propositions can involve open issues, as is the case with the weak modals: The 
proposition that it is possibly raining involves the issue whether it is raining, so the 
virtual background is updated to include also this option. Now it should be obviuos how 
to model the strong modals: Updating the factual content background to include the 
proposition that it must be raining is accompanied by updating all members of the virtual 
content background to include that it is raining. 1 9 
With this basic picture of update semantics in mind, how can we make now formal 
sense of intuitions like the one expressed in (7)? 
First, we have to model cases not as tuples of participants, as Lewis (1975) did, 
since, e.g., raining is nullary, but as situations, which in turn are conceived of as 
instantiating states of affairs or situation types. 
Second, we have to specify the kind of update that is made i f an assertion (or non-
assertion) of a conditional issue is contributed to the discourse. The effect of the update, 
if it affects the factual content background, i.e., i f the assertion is accepted, is that the 
intended topic situation is characterized as a domain where every subsituation or case c 
(with bare conditionals), that instantiates the antecedent type of situation, is part of a case 
c" that contains both c and a case c' that instantiates the consequent type of situation. 2 0 
One could speak thus of locally (i.e., in the intended topic situation) strict implication. 
With specific conditionals we have of course to replace 'every case d by 'the case d and 
analogously with the explicitly quantified conditionals. 
The effect of the update of the virtual content background is different: For every 
member p a member p' is addedthat gets the same treatment as described above, a 
member p" whose type includes the antecedent type, and a member /?+, whose type 
includes both the antecedent and the consequent type of situation. 
Suppose Max adds to his above-mentioned monologue: "If it is six o'clock, then Joe 
is getting up now in Hawaii", his assertion is accepted, M i a says: "It is six o'clock" and 
this is accepted as well. The effect is that the intended topic situation is widened to 
include not just Max' and Mia's discourse situation but also what Joe is actually doing in 
Hawaii. Thus the truth of the resulting accepted content wil l also depend on Joe.That is 
my basic picture of the effect of updating the content by adding a conditional issue. 
Before going on to the last section I wi l l add two remarks. The first one has the 
purpose to point out that according to this picture, the difference between a straight and a 
conditional proposition is just the difference between implicit and explicit antecedents. 
Remember that in our picture of a proposition, any proposition q is implicitly conditional 
on the intialization from which it started. A conditional proposition ifp then q therefore 
explicitly re-relativizes the implicitly conditional q. 
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The second remark expands on the role backgrounds play in the progress of 
discourse. They are not only what is changed by the ongoing discourse, but also what 
makes portions of discourse adequate or inadequate. E.g. concessive conditionals like (8) 
are adequate only with respect to factual content backgrounds that can also be 
characterized by (9): 
(8) Even if Steffi plays, the stadium is not full. 
[ Any case of Steffi playing is accompanied by a case of the stadium being 
not full. Implicative: Lower ranking events don't fill the stadium either.] 
(9) One would expect that if Steffi plays, the stadium is full. 
[ A l l normal cases of Steffi playing come with cases of the stadium being full. 
Implicative: One would not expect the same of lower ranking events.] 
2.3. Two puzzles and their treatment in update semantics 
With this picture of conditionalization as restriction by locally strict implication in mind let 
us attack two puzzles. 
The first one has to do with what I call modus ponens conditionals, namely 
conditionals that are asserted where the truth of the antecedent is in the factual 
91 
background. The puzzle is one for the Gricean account: With material implication this is 
equivalent with an assertion of the consequent, so why do people bother to utter a whole 
conditional? Are they just talkative, violating the maxim of quantity? I think not, I think 
they are saying something different. 
Suppose you just told me that you are from Wellington, I believe you, add this to the 
factual background, and then I say: 
(10) If you are from Wellington, then you should know Max. 
According to my analysis this is not equivalent with (11), as the material implication 
analysis would predict, since p entails ((p -> q) <-> q), but logically stronger, i.e., (10) 
unidirectionally entails (11) in such a context. 
(11) You should know Max. 
What (10) says on that background in addition to what (11) says is that your being from 
Wellington does not just happen to come along with your being obliged to know him, but 
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that it requires it, in other words that any relevant case of the former comes with a case of 
the latter. And this is similar to a causal statement, which would be, I submit, a closer 
paraphrase of (10) on the given background than the naked apodosis, if not a perfect 
equivalent, which is just a little more redundant in entailing once more what is already in 
the background: 
(12) Since you are from Wellington, you should know Max. 
Here we have a case of both object domain causation and evidential motivation at once: 
First your being from Wellington causes you to be obliged to know Max, and second it is 
good evidence, i.e., knowing that you are form there is a good motivation, for supposing 
that you are in that obligation. But giving a motivation for a claim that one makes shows 
always a higher degree of cooperativity than leaving it out. So (10) and (12) are not only 
logically stronger than (11) in the given context, but show also a higher degree of 
cooperativity. 
Of course, it is usual to abbreviate (10) as in (13): 
(13) Then you should know Max. 
So far for the first puzzle, the non-redundancy of modus-ponens-conditional utterances, 
which also showed the close relation beween causal and conditional utterances. The 
difference between (10) and (11) is modeled in update semantics by different updates that 
result in propositions with different truth conditions: If the intended topic situation 
contains several cases of the antecedent type (hard to imagine with this kind of example), 
but only one case of the consequent type, then (11) may still be true, while (10) is false. 
The second puzzle is posed by an apparent counterexample to my claim that 
conditionals restrict or relativize the validity of the consequent. There is a class of 
seemingly conditional constructions that do exactly the opposite: Instead of making a 
claim depend on some circumstance and therefore in an intuitive sense weakening it, they 
strengthen it in the same intuitive sense by claiming that its holds independent of the 
choice from some alternatively conceivable circumstances. And with this, as is easy to 
see, I am coming back to the unconditionals, because they are the construction type I am 
talking about here. 
Barwise (1986) has drawn attention to the fact that a conditional like (14) presupposes 
normal background conditions to obtain such as that there is no pollen around that makes 
Claire rub her eyes and so on . 2 2 
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(14) If Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy. 
But human languages allow us to get rid of at least some of these background 
assumptions, for instance by saying (15) instead of (14): 
(15) Whatever the circumstances, if Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy. 
So normal conditionals impose further conditions on backgrounds that are restricted 
anyway, but clauses like Whatever the circumstances are able to remove background 
restrictions and thereby strengthen the claim they modify. That's why I have come to call 
them 'unconditionals'. Further examples are (16) and (17): 
(16) Wherever you go, I will find you. 
(17) Whether you like it or not, your talk was simply boring. 
Interestingly enough, unconditionals seem to be enocoded in most languages by 
interrogative clauses, more precisely by alternative and constituent interrogatives. How 
come? These interrogatives define sets of issues (by enumeration or by parametric charac-
terization) as representing exhaustively the range of options that are currently taken into 
consideration. And this exhaustiveness is exactly what causes the unconditionalization 
effect: If all options that come into question require q, then q, unless you take more 
options into consideration. 
Conditionals on the other hand, even if they are of a disjunctive or a generalizing 
form, do not implicate that they exhaust what comes into question,2 3 therefore they don't 
have in general the strengthening effect. Compare (18) and (19). 
(18) If you take the plane to Antwerp, the trip will take 3 hours; if you take the car or go 
by train, it will take ten hours. 
(19) ?If you take the plane to Antwerp, the trip will take 3 hours; whether you take the 
car or go by train, it wil l take ten hours. 
(19) doesn't sound as correct as (18), because it presents going by car or by train as the 
only options under consideration where taking the plane is in the (virtual content) 
background. This can be only accepted with accommodation, i.e., supposing that after 
the first part of the sentence, the options are rearranged, and this goes together with the 
observation that the acceptability of (19) increases with the length of a pause after its first 
half. 
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Parametrically characterized antecedents behave analogically. 2 4 Compare (20) and 
(21): 
(20) Whatever she wears, Amanda looks pretty. 
(21) If she wears anything, Amanda looks pretty. 
Why does (20) sound like a compliment, whereas (21) sounds like a macho-joke that 
amounts to quite the contrary? Because (20) invites to take only situations into 
consideration, where Amanda is dressed, whereas (21) does not carry such a restriction 
and in fact makes us think of the cases where she is not, inviting the inference that then 
she does not look pretty. 
So the rule is: If the antecedent of a c-proposition exhausts the virtual content 
background at the current state of the discourse, then it is an unconditional, i f not it is a 
regular conditional. In each case it should be encoded accordingly, if the language allows 
for distinct encoding. 
Although intuitively the difference between unconditionals and conditionals seems to 
be striking at times, it lies only in the acceptability conditions of its utterance, not in the 
truth conditions of the resulting updated background, so both of them belong here. 
Finally, looking back at our examples with the distinction between conditionals and 
unconditionals in mind, it turns out that not only the non-argument alternative and 
constituent interrogatives are unconditionals, but that also some of the supposed lexical 
and phrasal conditionals are in reality unconditionals, namely non-temporal always and 
never, as well as in any case, under all circumstances, in short all those where the 
exhaustiveness is built in into the meaning. 
Notes 
1. These are only the most prominent names of people who have influenced me through their writings, 
some more are mentioned in the bibliography, but to give an exhaustive list is probably not possible. I 
would however like to thank Godehard Link, Hans Rott and John Perry who have helped me by asking 
questions and giving valuable comments and criticism. 
2. See van Benthem (this volume). 
3. The existence of coordinated conditional clauses as in "Pay him well and he will do anything for you" 
(example (28) below) and "You close the door behind you and you feel arrested" (describing a room) 
seems to be at variance with this statement, but it can be argued that the combination of an imperative-
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first conjunct with an indicative-second conjunct in fact turns the former into an adverbial, and that in the 
other case it is not the primary function of the first conjunct to conditionalize the second one. 
4. Cf. Comrie 1986, Danielsen 1968. 
5. Fortescue 1984. 
6. Cf. Haiman 1986, 1978. 
7. Cf. Cole 1982. 
8. Also called TAM-cluster, although this does not reflect the unmarked order, cf. Bybee 1985. 
9. Since topics in turn tend to be sentence initial all over the world (in fact new topics must precede the 
comment according to Gundel (1988:23If.)), Greenberg's famous universal 14 ("In conditional 
statements, the conditional clause precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages", 
Greenberg 1963: 84) seems to be a derivative rather than a primary phenomenon. 
10. This is the title of Haiman 1978. 
11. Haiman 1986:215. 
12. Ferguson et al. 1986: 10. 
13. Traugott 1985: 291. 
14. See the companion paper to the present one, Zaefferer 1990. 
15. Hans Rott has pointed out to me that since Garden fors is working with closure under logical 
entailment this difference doesn't come to bear. 
16. Gärdenfors 1988, ch. 7. 
17. Rott 1990. 
18. From an announcement of the 1989 European Summer School at Groningen, I learned that Frank 
Veltman, who used to call his framework "data semantics', now also calls it 'update semantics'. 
19. Situations are internally partially ordered with respect to containment, but for the more involved 
modalities they must be also externally ordered with respect to similarity, such that if there is some 
ordering source, say a deontically ideal situation, in the virtual background, it makes sense to speak of 
those situations that come as close to it, as is permitted by some condition. To give an example (Kratzer 
1981): In an ideal situation nobody is treated unjustly. But a situation where somebody has suffered 
injustice comes closer to such an ideal situation if that person has received recompensation than if he has 
been silenced. With the similarity ordering on situations Kratzer's proposal of a two-fold relativization of 
the consequent can be accommodated. 
20. If there are several such c, then there must be several such mutually disjoint c\ 
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21. Here I disagree with Hans Rott, who claims that 'ifs are accepted only if the antecedent is not 
accepted' (1986: 356) and therefore has to deny the very existence of modus ponens conditionals. 
22. (14) could be paraphrased as "Under default circumstances, if Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy", 
if the latter way of phrasing it would not invite the inference that non-default circumstances are taken into 
consideration, which is exactly what the Barwise example wants to rule out. 
23. Hans Rott (p.c.) suggests that in effect they implicate the contrary. 
24. The following examples are repeated from Zaefferer 1987. 
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